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14.1 Introduction: Humans And Computers Drawing 
Conclusions Responsibly
Consider Ned, who does not know the difference between a peanut and a cashew. In
fact,  cocktail nut is the most specific category in this region of Ned’s gastronomic
conceptual taxonomy. Now suppose I’ve taken it upon myself to teach Ned to see the
difference. So, I show him five labeled photos of peanuts and five labeled photos of
cashews. Then I show him a new picture of a nut without a label. He confidently
says, “Peanut!” and he is correct. I show him a bunch more new photos, and he
identifies  all  the peanuts  and  cashews correctly.  Mission accomplished.  Ned has
learned to visually discriminate peanuts and cashews.
Machine learning systems for  image recognition operate much the same way.
They are fed sets of images paired with descriptions, which are the  training data.
And then the systems generate descriptions for (or match pre-given descriptions to)
new images. It amounts to an advance in image recognition when a system can draw
more accurate conclusions than previous systems on the basis of the same training
data. But this is not the only sort of improvement possible. Training data can be
improved,  too.  The  set  of  images  could  include  more  relevant  variety,  or  the
descriptions could be more accurate, or the data set could just be more voluminous.
In our example of Ned, better training data might mean teaching him using sharper
images of peanuts and cashews.  Probably images that  showed differences in the
textures of the two types of nuts, all else equal, would be more helpful to him than
images that lacked this level of detail. 
It is tempting to think that if one set of training data yields computer systems that
draw more accurate conclusions than those from systems trained on other data, then
the data set that yields the more accurate systems is better. But I do not think this is
the whole story. As machine learning systems, such as image recognition systems,
become more and more sophisticated with wider and wider application, it is not just
the accuracy of the conclusions that matters. Just as a judgment pronounced by a
human might have been irresponsible, despite its accuracy, computer systems also
can draw conclusions irresponsibly though accurately. And this irresponsibility can
be due to the data on which the systems were trained. 
Here are a couple cases of human judgment that exemplify the kind of worry I
have in mind. Suppose we have an image of a man running behind a running woman
who has a frightened look on her face. Suppose I look at the image and say, “He’s
trying to hurt her!” Well, I might very well be correct. But, clearly, my judgment has
overshot my evidence. What if the man and the woman are both fleeing from some
other menace? Or suppose we have a photo of a man and a woman, both finely
dressed, smiling as they sit at a candle-lit table with an elegant dinner laid out before
then. If I say, “They’re on a date,” then my judgment has gone too far again. Perhaps
they’re just friends; it might even be that they’re both gay. 
Note that the worry here is not just epistemic. We might even suppose that images
that look relevantly like the first one 98% of the time really do picture one person
trying to hurt another, and we might suppose that 98% of images relevantly like
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the second really do depict dates. The irresponsibility involved here is more about
failure of respect than about a lack of evidence; it is more ethical than epistemic. 
Suppose I am barely acquainted with the two people—call them Jack and Cleo—
shown in the dinner picture. And suppose I was at that restaurant and happened upon
that very scene. If I ran into Jack at the coat check, I wouldn’t say, “How’s the date
going?” Expressing the judgment that they’re on a date would be presumptuous. And
my embarrassment will be fitting if Jack says, “I’m gay, you idiot.” But even if Jack
and Cleo are indeed on a date, my comment would be no less presumptuous. The
problem is that my inference was based on a superficial pattern they seemed to fit,
rather than on any intentions they had expressed or any other facts about them as
individuals.
Now  if  we  have  an  image  recognition  system  trained  on  data  that  include
judgments  like  those  in  the  two examples  I  just  described—the example  of  the
running people and the dinner example—then the irresponsible (though perhaps quite
accurate)  judgments  will  affect  the  way  the  system  operates  subsequently.
Irresponsible  judgments  in  the  training  data  are  likely  to  yield  irresponsible
conclusions at runtime. 
The main issue here extends beyond just image recognition. The general issue is
about the responsible use of AI systems capable of making judgments that might
carry some moral weight. How ought the developers of these systems ensure that the
systems judge responsibly?  One option is  to  train the systems just  for  statistical
accuracy, and then add an extra layer of processing to ensure that the judgments are
applied responsibly. A second approach is to train the responsibility into the system
from the beginning, by ensuring that the set of training data does not encode some
pattern  of  irresponsibility.  We  can  think  of  these  approaches  as  modular
responsibility and ingrained responsibility, respectively. 
In  the  rest  of  this  paper  I  will  consider  how  we  might  achieve  ingrained
responsibility for machine learning systems, especially image recognition systems,
that draw conclusions about what actions persons perform. This focus is attractive
because of the present and ongoing advances in the development of such systems. In
general,  I suspect that  it  is  prudent for us to prefer ingrained responsibility over
modularization. But, as we will see, the temptation to modularize responsibility will
be strong.
14.2 Presumptuous Judgment
Before returning to issues about image recognition and machine learning, it is worth
elaborating the central moral concern here. The basic worry is that some judgments
about a person’s actions may be objectionably presumptuous. My goal is not to give
a comprehensive account of presumptuousness or the reasons it is objectionable, but
I hope to say enough about it to illuminate the sort of worry I have in mind.
We  can  say  a  judgment  of  a  person’s  intentions  is  presumptuous when  the
intentions were ascribed on the basis of superficial features of the person, instead
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of on the basis of the person’s own individual profile of past and present mental
states. This way of characterizing presumptuousness is not intended to be a precise
definition  that  draws  a  sharp  boundary  around  all  the  cases  of  presumptuous
judgment. It is quite possible that our thinking about these issues is too hazy and
mutable to make drawing a sharp boundary desirable or even feasible. Instead, what
this characterization does is locate and orient presumptuous judgment with respect to
types of possible evidential bases. The more a judgment of a person’s intentions is
based on facts about that particular individual’s thoughts and desires—as manifested
in, say, prior action or speech—the less presumptuous it is. The more the judgment is
based on other  characteristics  of  the person—especially general,  population-wide
patterns she seems to fit—the more presumptuous it is. I will not provide here a
thorough defense of the claim that presumptuousness is morally problematic, but I
will try to say a little bit to make the claim plausible.
First, it is worth observing that many among us (including myself) tend to be
offended when people make unwarranted assumptions about our desires, goals, and
intentions. Consider this scenario: Suppose I have an acquaintance, Silas, who is a bit
overweight. I overhear a conversation in which Silas mentions that he has planned a
trip to the beach several  months from now. So I infer that  Silas  intends to lose
weight. (He wouldn’t want to look fat in his swimsuit, right?) Then, when a mutual
friend is preparing for a dinner party, to which Silas and I are both invited, I suggest
that she include only light fare on the menu, since (I believe) Silas is trying to lose
weight. Now, as it turns out, Silas is not at all concerned about his weight. It would
be fitting for Silas to be offended, or at least annoyed, at my presumptuousness. Note
that the problem is not that my inference was terribly faulty from a purely epistemic
standpoint; it was that I made an inference (which I then acted upon) about Silas’s
intentions, even though I did not know enough about Silas to do so responsibly. So, I
should have withheld judgment, or at least abstained from acting on my judgment. 
For another example,  consider another scenario involving Silas.  Suppose Silas
decides to send his daughter to the local public high school instead of the nearby,
expensive,  private  high school.  Upon hearing about  this,  Silas’s  neighbor Albert
infers that Silas is trying to save money. As it turns out, Silas’s choice was motivated
by his hope that his daughter will benefit from an education among a more inclusive
group of students. Here again, it would be fitting for Silas to react with offense or
annoyance at the presumptuous judgment.
Second, note the close link between presumptuousness and stereotypes. We can
understand many stereotypes as constituted by shared patterns of presumptuousness.
For example, imagine that Ravi is an Indian-American college student whose parents
immigrated to America shortly before he was born. At college Ravi chooses pre-med
as his major. Peter, Ravi’s roommate, assumes that Ravi is aiming to become a doctor
because of pressure from his demanding parents. It turns out that Ravi has always
been  interested  in  human  biology  and  the  practical  applications  of  it.  Peter’s
presumptuous  judgment  about  Ravi’s  goals  was  a  manifestation  of  a  general
stereotype Peter has accepted about Indian-Americans. Note that even if Peter had
been  correct  about  Ravi’s  motivations,  basing  his  judgment  on  a  stereotype
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about Indian parents still would have been inappropriate. It is not hard to think of
cases of stereotyping that are much more pernicious than this one.1 
Finally,  consider this not-too-far-fetched example, which is a bit more like the
image recognition cases that are our main concern. Imagine Tara, who is an academic
advisor at a large state university in the U.S. One of her duties is to have one-on-one
meetings with incoming students to help them choose and register for courses during
their  first  semester  at  college.  Now, after  a  couple of  years  of  conducting these
meetings,  Tara realizes that  the meetings would be much more productive if  she
proposed a default schedule to the student at the beginning of each meeting. So, she
tries this, and each student starts with a default schedule that includes Calculus I,
First-year Writing and Composition, Problems of Philosophy, and Intro to the Life
Sciences. At first, she does not customize the schedule for each student because she
has little information on which to base any recommendations. Because of a poorly
conceived information and record system at the university, she has just a photo of the
student and the student’s home address. However, after the first year of using her new
system, and despite her dearth of background information, Tara happens to notice
one regularity: Male students who hail from the northern part of the state and who
are pictured in preppy attire always want to sign up for Intro to Business. So, Tara
adjusts her system. For most of her advisees,  she continues to offer that original
default  schedule.  However,  for  her  preppy,  northern  males,  she  includes  the
introductory  business  course  in  place  of  the  life  sciences  course.  After  this
adjustment, Tara’s own personal records indicate that she has reduced her average
meeting duration by 5%. So she makes the adjustment permanent. 
Despite the increased efficiency from Tara’s newly adjusted policy, it may strike
us as suspect. But if there is a problem here, it is not inaccuracy or lack of evidence.
The policy was devised on the basis of plenty of data, and it is even backed by some
empirical confirmation. The problem is that she is predicting individuals’ preferences
(and  using  these  predictions  in  ways  that  might  influence  them)  on  the
1 A few  clarifications  about  the  relationship  between  stereotypes  and  presumptuous
judgment  may  be  helpful.  First,  not  all  cases  of  presumptuous  judgment  involve
stereotypes.  Stereotypes  involve  associating  an  individual  with  a  group  (Blum 2004,
Beeghly 2015). But it is possible to make a presumptuous judgment without relying on a
group association. For instance, I might make a presumptuous judgment about a person’s
intentions just on the basis of the assumption that her goals are the same as my own.
Second,  not  all  uses  of  stereotypes  involve  presumptuous  judgments.  This  is  simply
because not all  stereotypes are about persons’ intentions.  Finally,  regarding the moral
features of stereotypes and presumptuous judgments: Presumptuousness, all else equal,
tends  to  be  morally  undesirable,  but  it’s  controversial  whether  this  is  true  of  all
stereotypes. Beeghly (2015) argues that not all stereotyping is morally objectionable, and
Lippmann (1922) saw positive and negative aspects of stereotyping. In contrast, Blum
(2004)  holds  that  stereotyping  is  always  morally  objectionable  to  some  degree.  My
contention here, that presumptuous judgments manifest inadequate respect for persons as
individuals, is consistent with Beeghly’s explanation of when and how stereotypes fail to
respect persons as individuals. However, my thinking about why such a failure of respect
is morally objectionable shares more with Blum’s analysis than with Beeghly’s. In the
context of the present paper—with its focus on the moral evaluation of training data for
machine learning systems—it is enough for my purposes if at least some judgments are
morally objectionable precisely because of their presumptuousness. 
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basis of the persons’ conformity to a superficial pattern, and thus failing to treat them
as individuals. The problem is a moral one.
If indeed presumptuousness of the sort I’ve been gesturing at is undesirable, we
will not want our computer systems to issue presumptuous judgments. As already
noted,  one  approach,  the  modular  approach,  would have  us  outfit  our  computer
systems with an additional stage of processing which took the set of statistically
founded judgments and filtered out the presumptuous ones. The ingrained approach,
which  I’m  exploring here,  would  effectively apply a  filter  on the  opposite  end,
removing presumptuousness from the training data. To see how this would work in
the case of image recognition systems, we need to look a little more closely at these
systems and how they are trained.
14.3 Image Recognition And Sources Of Training Data
There are various kinds of image recognition tasks we may wish to have a computer
perform. Given a photograph, we may wish to have a computer classify what kind of
scene it is (for example, a desert or a grocery store) or identify  what objects are
pictured (for example, a camel or a cantaloupe). We might also wish to have the
computer draw more nuanced conclusions—specifically about the relations among
various elements and  what is happening in the photograph (Fei-Fei, Li 2010). For
example, we might like the computer to tell us that a camel is drinking from a spring
or that a boy is adding a cantaloupe to his shopping cart. 
Advances in computer vision in the last decade have begun to make automated
scene  classification  and  object  identification  more  practical.  And  recently,  new
research has made headway in the third sort of task. Some new image recognition
systems can tell,  with some accuracy, how the objects in an image are related—
reporting not just the what, but also the what’s going on. This progress is the result of
combining  two  branches  of  AI  research:  computer  vision  and  natural  language
processing.  The  new  image  recognition  systems  integrate  visual  meaning  and
linguistic meaning in the same models, facilitating greater precision and subtlety in
associating descriptions with images (Karpathy et al. 2014, Vinyals et al. 2014).
At a basic level, recent innovations notwithstanding, the new AI systems operate
on the same principles as their predecessors. The first step is usually to feed the
systems large sets of data. It is from this training data that a system “learns” (i.e.,
creates a rich model of the data). It is only once some learning has taken place that
the  machine  learning  system  becomes  useful.  (Whether  the  learning  process
continues once the system is in operation depends on the specific system and its
implementation.) In the case of image recognition, the training data includes scores
of images paired with descriptions. Different data sets include different images, and
the form of the descriptions may vary as well—from single-word descriptions to
multi-sentence paragraphs. 
270
What are the sources of training data for image recognition systems? It is tempting
to think we have an embarrassment of riches. The Internet, from professional media
outlets to social media, provides a never-ending stream of captioned images. It is Big
Data  par excellence.  Consider how e-commerce websites like Amazon and eBay
analyze their unceasing streams of consumer behavior data in order to train their
systems to make more intelligent product recommendations. Similarly, to train our
image recognition systems, one might think that we just need to point them at the
streams  of  captioned  photos  that  perpetually  pour  from  the  likes  of  Facebook,
Twitter, Flickr, Instagram, Pinterest, Imgur, etc.
But a bit of reflection shows that this approach is a non-starter. After all, why do
people caption images in the first place? The goal is certainly not to give plain and
literal, yet comprehensive, descriptions of the contents of the photos. Instead the goal
is to tell us about the things not pictured—like important background information—
that make the photo interesting. If a photo shows a chemist in her lab, the caption is
likely to say who she is and what she studies. It will not say anything like this: “A
woman with goggles and a white coat lifts a glass vessel containing blue liquid.”
Such a caption would be useless to us; we can notice all this (and much more) from a
quick glance at the photo.2 But this is exactly the kind of caption we need paired with
our image if it is to be part of our training data. The point, then, is that the training
data  we  need  for  image  recognition  systems—unlike  paradigmatic  big  data
applications in which the relevant data sets continually accrete through the everyday
course of events—must be artificially created and collected. 
Artificial creation of training data is a daunting task, but it’s not quite as difficult
as it  might initially seem. Researchers and developers can simply hire people to
describe photos. And with crowdwork services—like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk—
which  crowdsource  the  completion  of  large  sets  of  microtasks,  it  is  fast  and
inexpensive to create large sets of training data. Researchers can define tasks and
advertise them within Mechanical Turk, and then human workers (the “Turkers”)
find them and complete them. In 2009, computer vision researchers at the University
of Illinois used Mechanical Turk to acquire human-generated descriptions for over
8,000 images from the Flickr photo sharing website, in less than twelve days and at a
cost of less than $1,000 (Rashtchian et al. 2010). The result was a data set known as
Flickr 8k, which includes approximately 8,000 images paired with the descriptions
written by Turkers (Hodosh et al. 2013). Thus, crowdwork takes care of the major
practical obstacle in the way of training image recognition systems.3 So, now we can
begin worrying about ingrained responsibility—what it takes to make sure that none
of the image labels in our training data express presumptuous judgments.
2 As Hodosh et al. (2013) point out, “Gricean maxims of relevance and quantity entail that
image  captions  that  are  written  for  people  usually  provide  precisely  the  kind  of
information that could not be obtained from the image itself, and thus tend to bear only a
tenuous relation to what is actually depicted.”
3 Though crowdwork raises ethical issues of its own (Marvit 2014).
271
14.4 Integrated Responsibility For Still Photographic Training 
Data
How could a group of workers—individuals paid to label images—produce training
data that encodes responsible judgments about what people depicted in the pictures
are doing? The simple answer is that the workers must adhere to strict instructions
about the kind of descriptions they are to provide. If I am right that presumptuous
judgments  are  morally  objectionable,  then  the  instructions  should  rule  out
presumptuous judgments. So, one option would be simply to instruct the workers to
avoid presumptuousness. 
But this sort of instruction is awfully abstract and not the most straightforward to
operationalize on a case-by-case basis. Clearer instructions are required. As it turns
out, Hodosh et al., the team that created the Flickr 8k data set, did an admirable job
with their instructions. In a qualification test for workers who might write image
descriptions, the researchers gave prospective workers this characterization of a good
description:
A good description...
...should provide an explicit description of prominent entities in the image.
...should not make unfounded assumptions about what is occurring in the image.
...should only talk about entities that appear in the image.4
The third and especially the second of these three clauses should serve to rule out
many  cases  of  presumptuousness.  After  all,  part  of  what  constitutes
presumptuousness, as I’ve characterized it, is an inappropriately grounded judgment
about what is motivating a person. So, my complaint is only that these instructions
are not strict enough in what they prohibit. As we’ve seen, a judgment may be well-
founded, in that it is statistically well-supported, yet presumptuous nonetheless. If
presumptuousness  is  indeed undesirable,  the rules  for  making assumptions about
persons’ actions should be more strict than the rules for making assumptions about
other sorts of occurrences.5 For example, the graphical data in an image depicting
the view from a window looking out into a rainy day may be consistent with the
unlikely possibility that  the falling drops of water  are coming from a sprinkler
somewhere off to the side, but that wouldn’t make the judgment that it’s raining
inappropriate.  In  order  for  our  image  recognition  systems  to  be  as  useful  as
possible,  we would prefer an image that appears to depict rain be described as
depicting rain.6 A 2% chance that it is not actually raining is not enough to withhold the
4 This comes from the online appendix to Hodosh et al. 2013. 
5 This suggests another way to explain what is wrong with presumptuous judgment. To
judge a person’s mental states according to a standard like we would use for any other sort
of judgment  not  involving persons,  is  to take what  Peter  Strawson (1962) called the
“objective attitude” rather than the “participant attitude” toward the person.
6 Of  course,  the  image  recognition  system  could  report  the  falling
water,  and  we  could  rely  on  some  other  process  to  infer  from  the
falling  water  that  it  must  be  raining.  But  this  would  be  to  limit
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judgment that it is raining. However, a 2% chance of error is enough to withhold the
judgment that the dining man and woman are on a date.7 That is because there is
more to avoiding presumptuousness than making judgments with sufficiently high
probability.
To instruct workers in such a way that their descriptions avoid presumptuousness,
I propose the following addition to the instructions used by Hodosh et al.:  Do not
give a description of an action such that the person could plausibly deny that that’s
what  she was doing. As with the original  instructions,  some vagueness  remains.
However, the meaning of the instructions can be demonstrated with examples. (And
such examples could be included with the instructions to the workers.)
Consider Fig 14.1, in which a woman and a young boy stand next to a table
covered with various foodstuffs. This image, along with five English descriptions
written by Turkers, is included in the Flickr 8k data set.
too much the capacities of image recognition systems. A scene can be one that looks rainy,
and looking rainy may be both more intuitive and more useful information than the report
that it looks like water is falling from above. 
7 There’s nothing special about the specific probability values of 0.02 and 0.98, besides the
former  being  small  and  the  latter  being  large.  These  values  are  just  convenient  for
purposes of illustration. Values of 0.01 and 0.99 or 0.05 and 0.95 would have worked just
as well (although values that were too extreme or too moderate would indeed alter the
examples).
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Fig. 14.1  An image from the Flick 8k data set
The Turkers’ descriptions of Fig. 14.1 were as follows:
1. A woman and a boy are making hamburgers in the kitchen.
2. A woman in a white shirt prepares a large meal of hamburgers.
3. A woman is  holding a  jar  of  mustard  and  a  boy is  looking  at  a  tray of
hamburgers.
4. The woman has a blue shirt on with a kid to her side, and she is making
hamburgers.
5. Woman and young boy stand in a kitchen with a spread of burgers in front of
them.
Among these five descriptions, only (3) and (5) would be acceptable according to
the additional instruction I am proposing.8 The others make presumptuous inferences
about the woman’s intentions. It is clear that the woman is holding a mustard jar and
sticking some kind of utensil in another jar on the table. However, it is unclear what
she intends to be doing. She might be just taking a hamburger for herself; or perhaps
she is just sampling the mustard. (Returning to the point I noted earlier about the
relationship  between  presumptuousness  and  stereotypes,  it  is  worth  wondering
whether  the Turkers  would have  written  different  descriptions if  the  picture  had
included an old man in a suit instead of a young woman in a casual blouse!)
Figure 14.2 is another image from the Flickr 8k data set. 
The descriptions of Fig. 14.2 were as follows:
1. Four people are lining up to purchase tickets at the theater.
2. Four people standing outside of an outdoor ticket booth.
3. Four people wait outside in a line for ticket.
4. The man and woman at the window are turned around to the man and woman
behind them.
5. Two men and two women standing at the window of a ticket booth.
Among these descriptions, (1) and (3) would be prohibited by the rule I have
proposed. The reason is that they attribute intentions to the persons depicted. We are
not in a position to know that these people are indeed trying to acquire tickets. They
might be there just to ask a question, or perhaps they are in line to get a refund, not
make a purchase at all.
Despite these examples of how the instruction I’ve proposed would have affected
this data set, I must point out that the change would be very minor. If the workers
writing descriptions had adhered to my proposed instruction, the Flickr 8k data set
would  not be  very  different  than  it  is.  That  is  because  the  workers  attributed
intentions to the individuals pictured fairly seldom. This is good news. It means that
the data set is useful for training image recognition systems, without much risk of
generating presumptuousness.
But now we are in a position to observe that this success comes with a cost. The
fairly  strict  limit  on  what  is  allowed  in  the  descriptions  limits  the  scope  of
8 I do not intend this as a criticism of the Flickr 8k data set. Violations of the instruction I
am recommending seem to appear only rarely in the data set. However, this image and the
next are valuable for illustrating the worry I that is my focus.
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the judgments that can be produced by a system trained on such a data set. The
descriptions of the activities in the training images are to be limited to, at most, the
overt  behavior of the persons pictured.  So, the captions can describe  intentional
actions in only a very thin sense. For instance, we might say of a photo that it shows
a woman kicking a soccer ball, but we cannot say that she is passing or shooting—at
least not on the basis of a single still image. Necessarily missing is any attribution of
aims, attempts,  plans,  or  processes.  And if the training data lacks these sorts of
attributions, then a system trained on these data cannot possibly attribute them either.
If we want a machine learning system to provide rich, informative descriptions of
intentional actions, but also do so in a non-presumptuous way, then we will have to
broaden the training data.
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Fig. 14.2  Another image from the Flick 8k data set
14.5 Theoretical Grounds For Ascribing Intentions?
We have  seen  that  if  we  adhere  strictly  to  the  sort  of  principle  I’ve  advanced,
descriptions generated by a system trained on data like the Flickr 8k data set will be
limited in their informativeness. Such a system can offer very little in the way of
responsible  judgments  about  persons’  intentional  actions.  However,  many
applications—indeed any applications designed to intelligently assist a user with the
achievement of her goals—will need information about the user’s intentions. 
It  is tempting here to fall back on a general idea about the basic conditions of
successfully interpreting—making sense of the thoughts, behavior, and speech of—
one another. Let me explain. W. V. Quine famously argued that radical translation—
the process of translating the previously unknown language of a foreign speaker into
one’s  own  language—requires  applying  a  principle  of  rational  accommodation,
what’s more commonly known as a principle of charity (Quine 1960). The principle
is required when trying to make headway in a situation in which the only evidence
available to an interpreter is the overt behavior (including utterances) of the foreign
speaker  whose  language  the  interpreter  is  trying  to  understand.  The  behavioral
evidence will necessarily be compatible with many different translations, given the
many different background beliefs the foreign speaker may hold. In such a situation,
making any headway requires the interpreter to assume that many of her beliefs agree
with those of the foreign speaker. So, perhaps we need to do something similar in
attributing desires and intentions?
Along these lines, Donald Davidson argued that a principle of charity should be
extended to the posits about what desires or values a person has. Davidson (2004b)
explains the enlargement of the scope of the principle of charity this way: 
For in the plainest cases we can do no better than to interpret a sentence that a person is
selectively caused to hold true by the presence of rain as meaning that it is raining... It
follows  that  in  the  plainest  and  simple  matters  good  interpretation  will  generally  put
interpreter and interpreted in agreement... Just as in coming to the best understanding I can
of your beliefs I must find you coherent and correct, so I must also match up your values
with mine; not, of course, in all matters, but in enough to give point to our differences. This
is not, I must stress, to pretend or assume we agree. Rather, since the objects of your beliefs
and values are what cause them, the only way for me to determine what those objects are is
to identify objects common to us both, and take what you are caused to think and want as
basically similar to what I am caused to think and want by the same objects.
This may seem to justify some leeway for workers writing descriptions to ascribe
intentions to an agent depicted in some image, even when the image is consistent
with several alternative claims about the agent’s intentions. Perhaps we have no other
way forward. But I do not think this is so. It is far from clear that this sort of charity
is  appropriate  when  the  interpretive  activity  is  not  radical interpretation.  The
principle of charity is crucial when we have yet to establish that we are even talking
about the same objects as the person we’re interpreting. However, the principle is no
longer  required  if  enough  linguistic  commonality  has  been  established  that  the
interpreter is in a position to know the meanings of the person’s sentences (or if the
interpreter were in a position to ask the person for clarification). Hence, though the
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kind of charity Davidson describes may be a condition of interpreting others in some
unusual contexts human interaction, that does not justify allowing it as a heuristic in
the generation of training data for machine learning systems. After all, relying on
such a principle of charity yields presumptuous judgments. It is not exactly the same
sort of presumptuousness featured in the preceding examples, but it may be just as
bad. Instead of supplementing the information available with inferences based on
group  membership  (as  with  stereotypes),  according  to  the  present  strategy,  the
auxiliary information would be drawn from the inventory of mental states of the
person  writing  the  descriptions.  It  is  no  less  objectionable  to  simply  assume  a
person’s motivations are like one’s own than to assume that the person is motivated
like people to whom she bears a superficial similarity. 
An alternative way of attempting to resolve uncertainty about an agent’s intentions
is not to assume that her intentions match the interpreter’s, but rather to assume that
her  intentions align with those that  are most  prevalent  in the population. Daniel
Dennett (1989b), working very much in the same vein as Davidson, discusses how
we attribute desires when we take the so-called intentional stance toward an entity:
How do we attribute the desires (preferences, goals, interests) on whose basis we will shape
the list of beliefs? We attribute the desires the system ought to have. That is the fundamental
rule. It dictates, on a first pass, that we attribute the familiar list of highest, or most basic,
desires  to  people:  survival,  absence  of  pain,  food,  comfort,  procreation,  entertainment.
Citing any one of these desires typically terminates the “Why?” game of reason giving. One
is  not  supposed  to  need  an  ulterior  motive  for  desiring  comfort  or  pleasure  or  the
prolongation of one’s existence.
If  indeed there are desires or intentions that are shared by all persons, then it
cannot be presumptuous to judge of a particular individual that she has these desires
or intentions. But notice that there is a difference between ascribing a standing desire
to a person and judging that the satisfaction of that desire was the intention driving a
particular action. My intention when washing the dishes is more accurately described
as “getting the dishes clean” or “keeping the kitchen tidy” than in terms of any of the
more basic desires Dennett mentions. So, to assume of a person that all her actions
are to be interpreted as intending to satisfy these basic desires is another kind of
presumptuousness.9 
Even  if  an  overly  broad  appeal  to  basic  desires  is  just  another  form
presumptuousness can take, it is worth mentioning because of the distinctive worries
it raises. Some aims and values may be shared across all of humanity, but many are
not. The variety among our aims is a source of richness in the human experience. To
attempt to limit  our interpretations of an individual’s intentions to a fixed set of
common goals is to underestimate the diversity of human motivations. Hence it is to
view the person not as an individual with a distinctive orientation to the world, but as
9 I do not mean to imply that Dennett himself is guilty of making this assumption.
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an indistinctive node in a homogenous system.10 Such a view, if regularly invoked,
may result in the assumption of shared intentions becoming a sort of self-fulfilling
prophecy, ultimately narrowing, rather than enlarging, the courses of action open to
us.
Hence,  it  seems  that  neither  imputing  the  intentions  of  the  interpreter,  nor
imputing the intentions that are common, is an acceptable way to address the lack of
information  we  have  about  what  motivations  drive  the  actions  depicted  in  a
photograph. The more general principle we may draw from this is that information
about one person’s  goals and intentions ought not be used to reach conclusions
about those of another. Again, the point here is ethical, not epistemic. It is the upshot
of the preceding discussions of presumptuousness.
One possible response to this might be to argue that presumptuousness itself is not
a  problem.  Perhaps  presumptuousness  is  undesirable  only  when  the  intentions
presumptuously ascribed appear immoral, embarrassing, or otherwise unattractive.
Along these lines, suppose that, while shopping at the grocery store, I choose the
expensive, environmentally friendly cleaning spray. My actual motive might be to
avoid allergic reaction to a chemical in the standard variety of cleaning spray. But if
people believe that my intention is to be an environmentally responsible consumer, I
may not mind their inference too much. This suggests that we may not need to have
image labelers withhold judgment about any and all intentions the agent may have,
just the unattractive ones. The intuitive thought in the vicinity would be something
like this: It’s okay to guess at persons’ intentions, as long as we give the people the
benefit of the doubt. But this is not acceptable either. Although it may be a good rule
of  thumb  for  everyday  social  life,  and  although  it  may  avoid  some  negative
consequences of presumptuousness, it would be a totally inappropriate policy for our
image recognition systems. It would bias the training data set in a way that would
reduce its accuracy. After all, people often do have unattractive motives. To train the
system as though this were not true would be to introduce systematic error into the
system. We would be avoiding the moral problems at the expense of adding new
epistemic problems.11 
14.6 Going Beyond Still Photographic Data To Ascertain 
Intentions Responsibly
We have seen that attributing intentions on the basis of some kind of interpretive
charity—whether  the  interpreter  ascribes  to  the  person  the  interpreter’s  own
intentions, intentions that are common in the population, or intentions that paint the
person  in  a  positive  light—is  unacceptable.  Supposing we  still  wish  to  develop
10 Cf. Blum (2004).
11 And, of course, a further worry about this strategy concerns the thorny issue about how
we might go about categorizing intentions as attractive or unattractive in the first place.
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systems capable of making intelligent inferences about an person’s intentions, we
need additional sources of data. 
So, let’s consider what additional data would allow responsible judgments about
intentions.  One  limitation  of  the  Flickr  8k  data  set  has  nothing to  do  with  any
restrictions on the descriptions the image labelers were allowed to provide. Rather
the limitation is due to how the images in Flickr 8k were acquired. The researchers
note that images were “manually selected to depict a variety of scenes and situations”
(Hodosh et al.  2013).  In  effect,  this means that in very few cases is any person
depicted in more than one image. This fact, combined with the inherent limitations of
still images, entails that the data set contains almost no diachronic information. That
means that even the evidence of an agent’s overt behavior is severely limited. In
contrast,  with several  successive,  timestamped photos,  or  with a  few seconds of
video, instead of just a single still image, we may have a representation of behavior
sufficiently rich to ascertain more—at least something beyond the bare minimum—
about an agent’s intentions in acting. For instance, regarding a woman kicking a
soccer ball, we might be able to say whether she is passing, shooting, or just clearing
it. Unfortunately, with just a single still image we have information that is consistent
with too many different possible intentions on the part of the person pictured.
Consider Fig. 14.3, which is another image from Flickr 8k.
Here are the descriptions that the Turkers wrote to describe it:
1. A man dressed for cold weather plays with a stick with his black and brown
dog.
2. A man in a brown vest and glasses plays with a brown dog.
3. A man in orange pants and brown vest is playing tug-of-war with a dog.
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Fig. 14.3  Another image from Flickr 8k. Note the ambiguity of
the aims of the man holding the stick
4. A man tries to take a stick away from a brown dog.
5. A man tugging on a stick that a little dog has in his mouth.
All  of  these  descriptions—except,  perhaps,  for  (5)—display  some  degree  of
presumptuousness.  Also,  it  is  interesting  to  observe  at  least  some  apparent
disagreement among them. While (1), (2), and (3) suggest that the man’s intention is
to play with the dog, (4) suggests that the man’s aim is simply to get the stick. But,
most importantly for present purposes, note that it would not take much additional
data about this scene to make it pretty obvious which of these somewhat divergent
interpretations is most correct. A few seconds of video of the scene, or a series of
several photographs taken over the course of a few seconds, would likely be enough.
Or, if we had a record of the man expressing a desire to play with his dog, or,
alternatively, a record of him saying he intended to train his unruly canine, this might
be even more helpful. This points the way to a positive recommendation, though
perhaps  an  obvious one:  Attribution of  intentions to  a person,  in  a way that  is
informative, accurate, and not presumptuous, requires several data points about that
particular person. Likely, the more (and the more diverse), the better. 
The task of generating training data sets that are informative, accurate, and that
encode genuinely responsible judgments about persons’ actions, may require using
not just annotated visual information about the persons, but also data of other sorts,
such as the persons’ histories of verbal communication. Of course, drawing on richer
data sets requires more sophisticated machine learning systems.12 And, even with
additional data about an individual, the data available may still be compatible with
several different hypotheses about the person’s intentions. Continuing to add more
and more data about the person is the only non-presumptuous path to narrowing the
set of interpretive hypotheses about a person’s intentions down to just one.13 Thus,
there does, after all, appear to be a route forward that avoids presumptuousness, but it
is a formidable one. 
14.7 Modular Responsibility Reconsidered?
I have been considering what it would take to produce machine learning systems
capable of issuing responsible judgments about the intentions with which a person
acted. The approach I have considered is what I described at the outset as ingrained
12 Such work is already underway. See, e.g., Park et al. (unpublished ms.).
13 Along these lines, Dennett argues, “the class of indistinguishably satisfactory models of
the formal system embodied in [the] internal states [of an entity toward which we might
take the intentional stance] gets smaller and smaller as we add such complexities [such as
a wider range of behaviors]; the more we add, the richer or more demanding or specific
the  semantics  of  the  system,  until  eventually  we  reach  systems  for  which  a  unique
semantic  interpretation  is  practically  (but  never  in  principle)  dictated”  (1989b).
Notoriously,  according  to  both  Quine  and  Davidson,  some  indeterminacy  may  be
ineliminable. However, along with Dennett,  I doubt that any remaining indeterminacy
poses any practical or ethical problems in the context of machine learning systems. For
discussion of indeterminacy and its (in)significance, see Davidson (1984b).
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responsibility.  The  thought  was  that  we  could  create  systems  that  issued  only
responsible judgments, by ensuring that the data on which these systems were trained
included only responsible  judgments.  But,  as  we’ve  seen,  this  approach  will  be
difficult and so may require postponing benefits otherwise soon achievable.
Also at the outset I mentioned a modular approach as an alternative to ingrained
responsibility. The idea would be to accept training data that embodies the problems,
i.e., presumptuousness, that I have been discussing. And then the task would be to
add an extra stage of processing that would prevent the irresponsibility from being
propagated into applications. But note that an effective module for these purposes
would not  be just  a  simple filter.  An algorithm that  could accurately classify as
presumptuous  or  non-presumptuous  descriptions  of  actions  may  itself  require
machine learning. If that is so, then it seems better to avoid presumptuousness from
the beginning, in the training data that might originally introduce it. In other words, it
seems better to opt for ingrained responsibility. 
A final worry about the modular approach is that, in practice, it may be tempting
(for  convenience  or  other  reasons)  to  omit  the  extra  stage  of  processing.  The
“responsibility module” might simply be left out by a developer who didn’t consider
it important enough to bother with. But then irresponsible judgments would make
their way into computer systems we use, and we would likely never know.14 For this
reason also I hold out hope for a tractable approach to ingrained responsibility.
In light of this discussion of machine learning systems for image recognition, I
venture that  there is a more general—though perhaps unsurprising—lesson to be
learned here: We ought to include moral criteria among the requirements for our
machine learning systems and the data on which we train them, even though doing so
poses distinctive and difficult challenges. 
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